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306 CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS 
CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS. Funding de-
vices enacted whenever Congress is unable to pass one 
or more of the thirteen regular appropriations bills by 
the start of a fiscal year· are known as continuing 
resolutions. Continuing resolutions- when first passed 
in 1876 and up to J 98 I-were noncontroversial interim 
spending measures designed to keep the government 
afloat until the enactment of the regular appropriations. 
Since 1981, however, the use, scope, and size of these 
measures have dramatically expanded. Today, continu-
ing resolutions typically provide full-year funding for 
many (and sometimes all) federa l operations and serve 
as a vehicle for unrelated legislation. 
Continuing resolutions are extraordinari ly contro-
vers ial. Critics claim that this funding device disrupts 
the balance of power both within Congress and be-
tween Congress and the White House. Specifically, 
since continuing resolutions are not subject to the 
House of Representatives rule prohibiting the attach-
ment of substantive legislation to an appropriations 
bill, appropriations committees gain power at the 
expense of authorizing committees. House and Senate 
appropriations committee members who negotiate the 
final terms of the continuing resolution wield enor-
mous power. In fiscal year 1988, for example, these 
members negotiated a ban on smoking on domestic 
flights of two hours or less, a plan to allow states to raise 
the speed limit on rural highways to sixty-five miles 
per hour, an extension of the Clean Air Act, and a 
limitation rider prohibiting the Federal Communica-
tions Commission from modifying its regulations lim-
iting the co-ownership of a television station and a 
newspaper in the same market. 
Continuing resolutions a lso affect the President's 
veto power and, with it, the executive's role in shaping 
BUDGET POLICY. Critics of continuing resolutions argue 
that this funding device substantially undermines the 
veto power [see VETO, REGUI.AR] . By lumping together 
several (if not a ll) of the thirteen appropriations bills as 
well as unrelated substantive legislation, critics per-
ceive that Presidents will be reluctant to disrupt so 
many programs (most of which they endorse) through 
a single veto. Moreover, since a continuing resolution 
prevents the shutdown of the federal government by 
providing necessary funding, critics view the costs of a 
presidential veto as extraord inari ly high . Defenders of 
continuing resolutions, in contrast, argue that a Presi-
dent who is willing to use the veto power can help 
define the content of a continuing resolution. For 
example, in fiscal year 1988, President Ronald Reagan 
used his veto threat to preserve funds for antiabortion 
counseling [see ABORTION] as well as aid to the contra 
"freedom fighters" in Nicaragua. 
Continuing resolutions, a lthough maligned f~lr 
more often than they are defended, are like ly to 
remain a pe rmanent fixture on the budget landscape. 
Only once in the 1980s did Congress enact all thirteen 
appropriations bills by the e nd of the fiscal year. 
Indeed, more than one hundred continuing resolu-
tions were e nacted from 1965 to 1990. The prevale nce 
of continuing resolu tions is a by-product of many 
interrelated phe nome na, including the 1974 CONGRES-
SIONAL B UDGET ANI) I MPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT, the 
GRAMM-RuDMAN-HOI.LlNGS ACTS, and policy conflicts be-
tween the White House and Congress. Whatever the ir 
cause, continuing resolutions dramatically affect both 
the shape and content of fe d e ral budget d ecision-
making. 
[See also PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONA L RELATIONS.] 
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